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Takings-ISN'T THERE A BETTER APPROACH TO PLANNED
CONDEMNATIONS? -Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of
Transportation, 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990)
ALAN W. RODDY
I. THE RESERVATION ISSUE
S a government agency that restricts development on land slated for
public acquisition unconstitutionally depriving its owner of prop-
erty without compensation? In Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of
Transportation,' the Florida Supreme Court answered this question in
the affirmative, 2 invalidating Florida's right-of-way reservation statute
as a wholly improper use of the police power to take private property
without compensation.' In doing so, the court may have exposed the
state to enormous liability. 4 Although the statute, as it existed in 1987,
lacked an adequate remediation mechanism for owners deprived of all
use of their property, the court's categorical attack on this application
of the police power raises questions about any attempt by state or lo-
cal governments to keep conflicting development out of the path of
public acquisition. Because Joint Ventures' broad limitation on the
power of public entities threatens to aggravate the problem of Flori-
da's lagging infrastructure development by increasing the cost of pub-
lic improvements,5 this Note explores both the legal and economic
ramifications of the decision. The Note also discusses some alternative
approaches to the dilemma of balancing private rights and public
needs in planning for future condemnation of property.
1. 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990).
2. Id. at 623.
3. Id. at 626.
4. See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
5. At present, right-of-way acquisition costs consume approximately 30% of Florida's
roadway construction dollar. STATE CoMPREHENSIVE PLAN COMMITTEE, KEYS TO FLORIDA'S FU-
TtJE: WINNINo IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD 35 (1987). Coupled with a recent district court decision
in Hernando County v. Budget Inns of Florida, Inc., 555 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990),
which restricts a local government's ability to use development exactions to "bank" rights-of-
way for future road widening projects, the Joint Ventures decision will make it more difficult for
local authorities to provide the public facilities needed to stay concurrent with new development.
Under Florida's landmark growth management act, new development is generally not to be per-
mitted until the required infrastructure is available to serve it. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(10)(h)
(1991).
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A. The Florida Reservation Statute
Florida's highway reservation law6 was intended to reduce new con-
struction on private lands the State plans to acquire for right-of-way. 7
Although the sovereign has the inherent right to take private property
through eminent domain to advance a legitimate state interest, the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that the private
owner be paid for whatever is taken, 8 including any new construction.
Consequently, the Department of Transportation (DOT) and local ex-
pressway authorities are obligated to pay for all improvements on
condemned properties, even those permitted or otherwise approved by
local governments during negotiations for purchase of rights-of-way.9
Rather than an exercise of eminent domain power, Florida's high-
way reservation statute functioned as a police power regulation. Upon
deciding to widen a road or to construct a new one, DOT0 would
draft a map of the right-of-way needed for the project, then, after
providing direct mall notice to the affected owners and local govern-
ments, hold a public hearing on the new alignment." After the hear-
ing, DOT would file the final document as a "map of reservation" in
the county land records. 12 Local authorities were then prohibited from
issuing permits for any development within the reserved area for five
years, except for improvements to private homes and renovations of
commercial structures that did not raise the appraised value more than
twenty percent. 3 DOT could extend the restrictions for another five
years by repeating the procedure, but the agency was not obligated to
purchase the property at any time. 4 Owners claiming that the develop-
6. FLA. STAT. § 337.241 (1987). This was the version of the statute invalidated by the Flor-
ida Supreme Court in Joint Ventures.
7. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Transp., CS for HB 314 (1985) Staff Analysis 1 (final
Apr. 23, 1985) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 19, carton 1438, Tallahas-
see, Fla.).
8. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
314-15 (1987).
9. In one notorious example, an owner of unimproved land valued at $645,000, after re-
ceiving notice of impending public condemnation for Interstate 595 in Broward County, began
construction of a commercial complex. DOT finally paid $2.34 million for the property, plus an
additional $72,600 in relocation expenses, before tearing down the new building. Telephone in-
terview with Kevin Szatmary, 4th District Right-of-Way Administrator, DOT (Aug. 15, 1991)
(notes available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
10. Although the reservation statute gave both DOT and local expressway authorities the
right to file maps of reservation, see FLA. STAT. § 337.241(1) (1987), for the sake of simplicity,
this Note will refer to "DOT" or "State" only.
11. FA. STAT. § 337.241(1) (1987).
12. Id.
13. Id. § 337.241(2).
14. Id. § 337.241(2), (4).
PLANNED CONDEMNATIONS
ment restrictions were "unreasonable or arbitrary" and that they were
denied "a substantial portion" of the property's "beneficial use"
were entitled to challenge the restrictions in the state administrative
hearing process, then to appeal an unfavorable result in the appellate
courts. 5 The facts of Joint Ventures illustrate the operation of the
statute.
B. The Joint Ventures Case
Joint Ventures, Inc. bought an 8.3-acre parcel next to busy Dale
Mabry Highway near Tampa in 1969.16 In 1985, DOT, following the
statutory procedure, filed a map of reservation with the clerk of court
in Hillsborough County, identifying 6.49 acres of Joint Ventures'
property as a site for a future storm drainage area for the improved
highway. 7 Joint Ventures, Inc. appealed the designation in an admin-
istrative action and then contracted to sell the site to a third party for
$800,000, contingent upon the new owner being able to develop it."8
The hearing officer refused to grant any relief on grounds that the
designation was not unreasonable or arbitrary. 9 During the process of
appeal to the First District Court, the owners and DOT settled the
claim, and the State purchased the property. 20 The district court, how-
ever, retained jurisdiction and upheld the statute on the basis that
owners whose properties are taken without compensation by the reser-
vation restrictions have "an appropriate avenue of relief" through an
inverse condemnation action.2' The court then certified the following
question to the supreme court: "[w]hether subsections 337.241(2) and
(3) are unconstitutional in that they provide for an impermissible tak-
ing of property without just compensation and deny equal protection
and due process in failing to provide an adequate remedy."'
15. Id. § 337.241(3). This provision was amended in 1989 to change the "and" to an "or."
Ch. 89-232, § 9, 1989 Fla. Laws 971, 975-76 (amending FLA. STAT. § 337.241(3)); see infra notes
120-22 and accompanying text.
16. Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 519 So. 2d 1069, 1070 (Fla. Ist DCA
1988), quashed, 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990).
17. Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 623 (Fla. 1990).
18. Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 519 So. 2d 1069, 1070 (Fla. Ist DCA
1988), quashed, 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990).
19. Brief for Appellant at 9, Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622
(Fla. 1990) (No. 71878).
20. Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 519 So. 2d 1069, 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA
1988), quashed, 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990).
21. Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 519 So. 2d 1069, 1071-72 (Fla. 1st DCA
1988), quashed, 563 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1990). The court cited Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor & Common
Council of Englewood, 237 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1968), a prominent "official map" case, which inter-
preted a similar state law to include an implied remedy of compensation for temporary takings.
For more discussion of official map statutes, see infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
22. Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 519 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Fla. 1st DCA
1988), quashed, 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990).
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In an opinion written by Justice Barkett, a narrow majority of the
supreme court struck down the statute, holding that suppressing the
value of private property to reduce the cost of public acquisition was
not a proper use of the police power, but rather a "thinly veiled at-
tempt to 'acquire' land" without compensating the owners.Y3 In the
majority's view, neither the inverse condemnation remedy,2 which
lacked the procedural and substantive protections of eminent domain
proceedings, 25 nor the statute's administrative appeal procedure pro-
vided sufficient relief to affected property owners to cure the statute's
constitutional infirmity. 26 The three dissenters, however, led by former
Chief Justice Ehrlich, agreed with the district court that the omnipres-
ent right to file an inverse condemnation action against the State
would protect affected owners, so there was no need to invalidate the
statute as a whole.27 Although the dissent did not challenge the major-
ity's assessment of the police power issue, Justice Barkett's novel
analysis of the propriety of using the police power in this manner mer-
its further exploration before a discussion of the owners' available
remedies.
C. The Tests for Takings
The U.S. Supreme Court has long upheld land use regulations that
are substantially related to the public health, safety, welfare, or mor-
als, which are not unreasonable or arbitrary, 2 and which do not go
too far in restricting private rights. 29 Regulations that fail these stan-
dards, however, are "takings" that invoke the Fifth Amendment's
compensation requirement.30 According to a more recent decision of
the Court, even a temporary deprivation of all use of a property, be-
yond normal permitting delays, may constitute a compensable tak-
ing.31
23. Joint Ventures, 563 So. 2d at 625.
24. The U.S. Supreme Court described the differences between the two actions in Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 n.2 (1980). "Eminent domain refers to a legal proceeding in
which a government asserts its authority to condemn property. Inverse condemnation is 'a short-
hand description of the manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of
his property when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted."' Id. (citation omitted).
25. Joint Ventures, 563 So. 2d at 627.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 628-30 (Ehrlich, C.J., dissenting).
28. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); Executive 100, Inc. v.
Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1540 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 55 (1991).
29. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316
(1987); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
30. Executive 100, 922 F.2d at 1540.
31. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 321.
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When a court determines that a compensable taking has occurred, it
may hold the offending restriction to be either unconstitutional as ap-
plied to particular properties or facially unconstitutional and therefore
void in all applications. 32 The Joint Ventures owners argued for the
latter approach to the Florida reservation law, attacking the very pur-
pose of the statute rather than its effects on their own property.3 3 In
doing so, the owners converted what likely would have been a strong
"as applied" claim34 into a facial challenge.
Facial attacks on land use regulations are rarely successful. To over-
come a strong judicial reluctance to interfere with legislative preroga-
tives in this area, a claimant must show that the offending regulation
is invalid in every conceivable application.35 Once a regulation is
deemed to be based on an improper police power purpose, however, it
violates substantive due process and cannot have a valid application.
The Joint Ventures majority's reasoning in concluding that the statu-
tory motive was improper is therefore the cornerstone of this unusual
decision and critical to interpreting it.
II. THE JOINT VENTURES POLICE POWER INQUIRY
Rather than consulting prior case law on the constitutionality of
reservation laws, the majority instead relied heavily on a 1975 Texas
case involving a municipality's refusal to provide public utilities to a
development project,3 6 on a 1958 zoning decision of the First District
Court of Appeal in Board of Commissioners of State Institutions v.
Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co. ,7 and on a battery of zoning cases
from other states cited in Tallahassee Bank. These decisions fit a com-
mon pattern, invalidating extreme, arbitrary, and discriminatory de-
velopment restrictions placed on individual properties coveted by
municipal authorities. The most commonly abused device was the
zoning power. In the majority's view, "no valid distinction" sepa-
rated the motives behind these deliberate attempts to depress property
values and those driving the reservation statute.3 8 As the following sec-
32. Id.
33. Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 624-25 (Fla. 1990).
34. In this case the reservation prevented the owners from using 6.49 of 8.3 acres, or 78%
of the property. Id. at 623. Although other factors must be considered in an as-applied taking
claim, 78% is a substantial portion of the beneficial use of the property.
35. See Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796 (1984); Eide
v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 724 n.14 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1073
(1991).
36. San Antonio River Auth. v. Garrett Bros., 528 S.W.2d 266 (rex. Ct. App. 1975).
37. 108 So. 2d 74 (Fla. Ist DCA 1958), writ quashed, 116 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1959).
38. Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 626 (Fla. 1990).
117319921
1174 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 19:1169
tions show, however, these municipal actions suffered from a consti-
tutional malady distinct from the one diagnosed by the Joint Ventures
majority.
A. The Reverse Spot Zoning Cases
The Tallahassee Bank decision and the cases it cited from other
states all involved invalidation of municipal zoning designations arbi-
trarily applied to individual parcels or small areas lacking physical
characteristics that justified discriminatory treatment. Such treatment
is commonly called "spot zoning" when the owners of the isolated
parcels benefit from the designation and "reverse spot zoning" when
they suffer a special burden from it.9 Whether of the ordinary or "re-
verse" variety, creation of isolated zoning districts raises the specter
of unfair discrimination, 40 the common theme in these decisions.
In Tallahassee Bank, owners of five parcels next to the Florida capi-
tol complex challenged the valuations given their properties in eminent
domain proceedings. 41 They argued that the properties had been held
in a restrictive zoning classification because the City of Tallahassee
was trying to help the State to expand the complex by reducing the
cost of property acquisition. 4 The court held that the ordinance was
"arbitrary and unreasonable ... as applied to the property, ' 43 a con-
clusion "supported by the many decisions which condemn the arbi-
trary adoption of a zoning ordinance for the sole purpose of
depressing land values preliminary to eminent domain proceedings."4
Factually, Tallahassee Bank and the reverse spot zoning decisions it
cited from other states were all similar. In State ex rel. Tingley v.
Gurda,45 a case that inspired the others, 46 the City of Milwaukee had
rezoned a newly annexed block within a larger industrial area from an
industrial to a residential designation. The result was a decrease in
value, from more than $15,000, to about $3,000.47 Emphasizing the
unreasonableness of a residential category for this parcel, and finding
"suggestions in the record" that the city also wanted the property for
39. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 132 (1978).
40. Id.
41. 108 So. 2d at 76-77.
42. Id. at 77.
43. Id. at 85.
44. Id. at 86.
45. 243 N.W. 317 (Wis. 1932).
46. Grand Trunk Western R.R. v. City of Detroit, 40 N.W.2d 195, 199 (Mich. 1949),
quoted paragraphs from Gurda on the issue of misuse of zoning power; Long v. City of High-
land Park, 45 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Mich. 1950), in turn, quoted Grand Trunk; Robyns v. City of
Dearborn, 67 N.W.2d 718, 720 (Mich. 1954) relied upon both Long and Grand Trunk; Kissinger
v. City of Los Angeles, 327 P.2d 10, 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) cited Grand Trunk and Gurda.
47. Gurda, 243 N.W. at 320.
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a road corridor, the court held the rezoning ordinance to be an abuse
of zoning power. 48 In the view of the court, zoning could be used only
to protect areas set aside for specific uses from encroachment of in-
compatible uses.4 9
Similarly, in Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co. v. City of De-
troit5 0 the Michigan Supreme Court, relying on Gurda, invalidated an
attempt by Detroit to downzone thirteen undeveloped blocks along an
industrial rail corridor to a residential category. The court held the
rezoning action, based on a desire to make condemnation for low-cost
housing development cheaper, to be "unreasonable and confisca-
tory. ' ' 5' One year later, the same court, citing Grand Trunk, again
invalidated a residential zoning designation in Long v. City of High-
land Park2 because it had been unreasonably applied to a lone parcel
that the local school board was negotiating to buy, reducing the value
of the property from $40,000 to only $5,000. Four years later, in Ro-
byns v. City of Dearborn5 the Michigan court again refused to up-
hold a longstanding zoning classification on eight adjacent narrow
lots rendered virtually useless by setback requirements that left no
building space. The city was planning to condemn these parcels for
use as a park.14 Finding the restrictions to be "unreasonable and con-
fiscatory," and relying on its two preceding decisions in Grand Trunk
and Long, the court held them to be "invalid as applied. ' 55
Likewise, in Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles,56 the California Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal voided a single-family residential zoning
category that was hurriedly placed on a property the city wanted for
airport expansion only days after the owner acquired permits to build
apartments on it. The court found the city's action to be a spot zon-
ing, which was arbitrary and discriminatory. 57 According to the court,
it was also a clear attempt to "depress the value of the ... property
in order that it might be acquired for airport purposes" at a reduced
rate.58 The rezoning was therefore "an attempt on the part of the city
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 40 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. 1949).
51. Id. at 200.
52. 45 N.W.2d 10 (Mich. 1950).
53. 67 N.W.2d 718 (Mich. 1954).
54. Id. at 720.
55. Id.
56. 327 P.2d 10, 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 16.
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to use its police power to take ... property without due process of
law and without payment of compensation for that taking." 5 9
B. Garrett Brothers
In addition to the reverse spot zoning cases, the Joint Ventures ma-
jority also relied extensively on the Texas appeals court decision of
San Antonio River Authority v. Garrett Brothers60 for the proposition
that the police power is a mechanism limited to actions in which "the
government agency is acting as an arbiter of disputes among groups
and individuals for the purpose of resolving conflicts among compet-
ing interests." 61 According to the Texas court, however, the govern-
ment abandons the role of the "neutral arbiter" when it attempts to
reduce the cost of future property acquisitions by preventing develop-
ment on private land. In such cases, the court held, the government:
is no longer an impartial weigher of the merits of competing interest
among its citizens. Instead, it has placed a heavy governmental
thumb on the scales to insure that in the forthcoming dispute
between it and one, or more, of its citizens, the scales will tip in its
own favor.62
In Garrett Brothers, the City of San Antonio, colluding with the
local river authority, had tried to stop a large development project it
had already approved by denying the developers the permits necessary
to install utilities on the site. 63 The court found that this use of the
police power to reduce the costs of public acquisition placed an unfair
burden on the owners whose property rights were restricted. 64 In the
opinion of the court, these costs were most appropriately borne by the
public as a whole, and transferring them to individuals therefore con-
stituted a taking. 65
C. Analysis of the Majority's Police Power Treatment
The Tallahassee Bank decision and its antecedents from other states
share a number of common elements. They all involved attempts by
59. Id. at 15.
60. 528 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
61. Id. at 273-74. This narrow view of the police power, similar to the one espoused in State
ex rel. Tingley v. Gurda, 243 N.W. 317, 320 (Wis. 1932), seems to leave no room for protecting
the public as a whole from the acts of an individual.
62. Garrett Bros., 528 S.W.2d at 274.
63. Id. at 268-70.
64. Id.
65. Id. Some caution is warranted in applying the Texas takings cases in other jurisdictions
because that state's constitution mandates compensation for property taken or damaged. See
City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 393 (Tex. 1978).
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municipalities, through the abuse of the zoning power, to legislatively
single out individual tracts or small areas. These actions caused, and
were intended to cause, drastic reductions in property value and car-
ried no time limit. Hence, they not only treated similarly situated
properties differently, raising equal protection concerns, but also went
too far by placing extraordinary burdens on one or more property
owners.
Except for Garrett Brothers, which also dealt with selective treat-
ment of an individual property, these cases involved classic "reverse
spot zoning."66 None of these decisions cited Nectow v. City of Cam-
bridge,67 in which the U.S. Supreme Court originally attacked spot
zoning as invalid for having "no foundation in reason ... a mere
arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation
to the public health, the public morals, the public safety or the public
welfare .... ,, 6 Nevertheless, the influence of the Nectow prohibition
on spot zoning is obvious. The principal problem with the municipal
actions in these cases did not lie in the lack of relationship to public
welfare, but rather in the arbitrary and unreasonable application of
severe restrictions against selected owners. Consequently, they are of
limited application to the judicial review of a statewide program
which, in many cases, placed little burden on individual property own-
ers.69 A review of the status of reservation law in other jurisdictions
would have been more pertinent.
D. Reservation Programs in Other States
The Joint Ventures majority curiously failed to consider other
states' treatment or use of highway reservation laws or the very simi-
lar "official map" statutes. A number of other states have enacted
highway reservation statutes, only one of which has been facially in-
validated. 70 These statutes either restrict the issuance of development
permits on lands designated for future public acquisition or simply
66. Kissinger and Garrett Bros. also involved hasty attempts to stave off developments al-
ready underway and so more directly damaged the private owners involved.
67. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
68. Id. at 187-88 (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395
(1926)).
69. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133 (1978) (isolated zon-
ing districts created as part of citywide comprehensive preservation program not unconstitution-
ally discriminatory).
70. Lackman v. Hall, 364 A.2d 1244 (Del. Ch. 1976); see infra notes 77-79 and accompany-
ing text; see also Daniel R. Mandelker, Interim Development Controls in Highway Programs:
The Taking Issue, 4 J. LAND UsE & ENVTL. L. 167, 198 n.184 (1989) (listing reservation statutes).
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refuse to compensate the owners for the new buildings. They vary,
however, in the duration of the restriction and in the remedy provided
to substantially affected owners. Montana law, for example, provides
for "no compensation" reservations lasting only one year, but grants
no remediation. 71 California, on the other hand, prohibits all permits
for construction costing more than $500 in mapped rights-of-way for
an indefinite period, 72 but grants an appeals board review of any per-
mit denial. 73 The board is to consider whether there has been substan-
tial damage to the owner's rights, whether it denies the owner a fair
return, and whether, in justice and equity, a permit should be
granted.74
In addition, several other states use the permit-or-buy approach,
where the existence of a reservation map gives the state a delay of
several months after receiving notice of a building permit application
to either condemn the property or approve the permit. 75 These reserva-
tion programs may have avoided legal challenges because any proper-
ties in contention were simply purchased by the state through eminent
domain proceedings before a challenge could arise.76
Before the Joint Ventures decision, only one other highway reserva-
tion statute has been declared unconstitutional on its face. In Lack-
man v. Hall,77 a Delaware chancellor found fault with that state's
limited relief mechanism for aggrieved owners. Instead of providing
them a variance or administrative hearing procedure, the offending
statute provided a permit-or-buy provision as its only remediation. 8
The court held that such a provision authorized the state's Highway
Department to improperly "accelerate the taking of presently un-
needed property as a virtual punishment to a private owner who dared
71. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 60-4-108, 60-2-209 (1991).
72. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 741 (West 1990).
73. Id. § 741.2.
74. Id. § 741.4.
75. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 39-1311 to -1311.05 (1988) (state has 60 days from permit
request to notify permitting officer of intent to negotiate, then six months to purchase or bring
suit); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 27:7-66, -68 (West Supp. 1991) (state has 45 days to make recommen-
dation on permit, then six months to purchase or bring suit); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 4-
510 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (owner must give state 60 days notice of permit application, state
then has 45 days to notify owner of intent to acquire and 120 days to take action). A Delaware
court, however, invalidated that state's reservation law because it provided no other relief mech-
anism and authorized the state to purchase land it effectively had admitted it did not yet need.
See infra notes 77-79.
76. In the aftermath of the Joint Ventures decision, the Florida Legislature used such a
permit-or-buy provision in its hastily adopted alternative reservation procedure. See infra note
131.
77. 364 A.2d 1244 (Del. Ch. 1976).
78. Id. at 1248.
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to improve his land" and therefore effectively extorted the private
owner. 79 As another commentator has observed, however, this conclu-
sion is based on the erroneous assumption that the owner has the right
to withhold his or her property from a condemning authority. 0 Al-
though the Lackman case is of limited application in other jurisdic-
tions, it illustrates the general principle that a reservation statute must
provide a variance procedure or other remediation for owners of se-
verely affected properties.
Reservations have also been invalidated in specific instances where
they went too far in terms of either duration or extent of coverage of
a particular property. For example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
found an unconstitutional deprivation of property rights in Urbaniza-
dora Versalles, Inc. v. Rivera Rios,8 where the government of Puerto
Rico had frozen a thirty-two-acre tract for fourteen years by designat-
ing it for use as a highway interchange. The court noted with ap-
proval, however, that the statute had recently been amended to
specify a maximum reservation period of only eight years. 8 2 In Mary-
land-National Capital Park & Planning Commission v. Chadwick,83
Maryland's highest court held unconstitutional as applied a three-year
reservation of an entire 104-acre tract. The court refused to condone
the deprivation of all use of a property for parkland, but distin-
guished roadway reservation cases:
[W]e recognize the need to promote intelligent planning by placing
reasonable restrictions on the improvement of land scheduled to be
acquired for public use. We do not, therefore, condemn as beyond
the police power the enactment of reservation statutes which are
reasonable in their application both as to duration and severity. 4
Courts reviewing highway reservation programs that operate by re-
striction, rather than by triggered acquisition, therefore look at the
specific effect of the program on the individual owners in deciding
their constitutionality.
79. Id. at 1252-53.
80. Mandelker, supra note 70, at 208-09. This article contains a more comprehensive review
of state court reservation decisions.
81. 701 F.2d 993, 998-99 (1st Cir. 1983).
82. Id. at 997.
83. 405 A.2d 241 (Md. 1979).
84. Id. at 250. The typical reservation for parkland, by the very nature of the intended use,
must ordinarily encompass a larger portion of a private property than the average highway reser-
vation. Courts may also view the public need for parks as less pressing than the need for road-
ways.
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E. Official Map Statutes
The official map ordinances have a much longer history in this
country than highway reservation statutes, going back as far as Wil-
liam Penn's early plans for Philadelphia.85 These ordinances, usually
municipal regulations enacted under state enabling legislation, author-
ize city authorities to designate private lands for future acquisition. In
this century, municipal authorities have used them to restrict develop-
ment on lands to be acquired by the public.8 6 Like their state reserva-
tion counterparts, they generally have fared well in the courts as
exercises of the police power to control reckless construction.
In Headley v. City of Rochester,87 the most famous of the official
map cases," New York's highest court took a deferential approach to
Rochester's ordinance in dismissing one owner's challenge on the
grounds that he had failed to prove damages. 9 The court saw no sinis-
ter motive behind the ordinance.
So long as the owners of parcels of land which lie partly in the bed of
streets shown on such a map are free to place permanent buildings in
the bed of a proposed street and to provide private ways and
approaches which have no relation to the proposed system of public
streets, the integrity of the plan may be destroyed by the haphazard
or even malicious development of one parcel or tract to the injury of
other owners who may have developed their own tracts in a manner
which conforms to the general map or plan.9
The court found "quite illusory" any connection between this statute
and a New York City ordinance it had invalidated four decades earlier
85. See ROBERT R. WRIGHT & MORTON GITELMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 353
(3d ed. 1982).
86. Id.; ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK, LAND UsE-CoNTROLS: CASES AND MA-
TERIALS 141 (1981).
87. 5 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y. 1936).
88. See 7 PATRICK J. RoHAN, ZONN & LAND USE CONTROLS § 46.02 n.6 (1990); 5 NORMuAN
WILIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW § 155.07 (1985).
89. Indicating the court's view that the ordinance's overall intrusion on property rights was
minimal, the court observed:
It is perhaps not without significance that during these years [since the state enabling
legislation was enacted] no owner has claimed that the statute has actually interfered
with his enjoyment of the land, or has prevented him from obtaining a permit to
improve the land in a manner which he deemed desirable.
5 N.E.2d at 200-01.
90. Id. at 199.
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for providing no compensation to owners who constructed buildings
in reserved areas. 9'
Thirty years later, in Rochester Business Institute v. City of Roches-
ter,92 the Appellate Division was even more emphatic:
There is little doubt that an objective which seeks to achieve better
city planning falls fully within the concept of promoting the general
welfare.... If the minimal damage to plaintiffs involved here by
enforcement of the setback restriction renders the specific
application of the Rochester Plan unconstitutional, then the public is
in grave danger of being deprived of the very valuable tool of city
planning for the future.93
When such restrictions go too far, however, covering all or most of a
particular property, this deferential attitude evaporates, resulting in
an as-applied invalidation, while leaving the statute intact.94
More important to the Joint Ventures analysis is a 1957 decision of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court upholding that state's official map law
against a police power challenge. In State ex rel. Miller v. Manders,95
the court, which had disapproved of the discriminatory rezoning of an
industrial tract in Gurda and thereby inspired the cases underpinning
the influential Tallahassee Bank decision, distinguished Gurda as in-
volving a bare taking of existing value.
We consider that the zoning restriction in State ex rel. Tingley v.
Gurda, supra, is readily distinguishable from those imposed by [the
Wisconsin official map statute]. We cannot spell out of the latter
statute any legislative motive to depress existing property values.
Furthermore, the saving clause [providing a variance procedure]
protects a property owner against any substantial damage that might
be inflicted on him in the future operation of the statute by denial of
a building permit.9
91. Id. at 202-03, 206-08 (distinguishing Forster v. Scott, 32 N.E. 976 (N.Y. 1896)). A pro-
vision that denies compensation for property taken in eminent domain proceedings runs broad-
side into the Fifth Amendment's mandate. For the same reason, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court invalidated a similar three-year reservation for parkland in Miller v. City of Beaver Falls,
82 A.2d 34 (Pa. 1951). Arguably, though, such a provision would have the advantage of giving
the owner the most flexibility to use the property productively in the interim.
92. 267 N.Y.S.2d 274 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966).
93. Id. at 279-80 (citation omitted).
94. See, e.g., Jensen v. City of New York, 369 N.E.2d 1179 (N.Y. 1977) (official map
statute invalid as applied where it rendered 78% of owner's property unusable).
95. 86 N.W.2d 469 (Wis. 1957).
96. Id. at 475.
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Thus, the very court that had led the charge against arbitrary rezon-
ings to destroy private property value saw nothing to attack in the
official map statute. Instead it endorsed the program as a valid means
of promoting the public welfare by encouraging better city planning
and protecting the interests of the taxpayers.9
7
In sum, courts of other states have not held either reservation or
official map laws to be facially improper uses of the police power un-
less they provided no remediation procedure for severely affected
properties or simply denied compensation for new buildings at the
time of public acquisition. Precondemnation property restrictions
have not been held invalid in individual cases unless they were applied
in a discriminatory fashion or were taken too far.98 This type of re-
striction, as part of a roadway construction program, will ultimately
result in a direct benefit to many of the same private owners by way
of improved accessibility. Traditional zoning regulations, on the other
hand, generally confer no more than a general social benefit to the
property owner restricted. The U.S. Supreme Court has sanctioned
the inclusion of even these general benefits back to the owner as a part
of the calculus of whether a regulatory taking has occurred.9 There-
97. Id. at 472-73.
98. These factors account for the overwhelming majority of the judicial invalidations of
reservation actions.
Some critics of reservations have clouded the issue of the validity of these programs by citing a
mixed bag of "as applied" invalidations of reservation, official map, and zoning restrictions as
support for the proposition that reservation or official map laws are facially unconstitutional.
See Brief for Appellant at 22, Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622
(Fla. 1990) (invalidation is "uniform" result of court decisions); S. Cary Gaylord & Kimbel L.
Merlin, Status of Right-of- Way Reservations: How Far Can the Government Go?, 1990 INsT. oN
PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DoMAIN § 7.03, at 7-22 to 7-35 ("majority" view is that official map
and reservation laws are unconstitutional). Some of the cases cited include: Urbanizadora Ver-
salles, Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d 993 (1st Cir. 1983) (14-year reservation of 32-acre tract for
highway interchange invalid as applied); Grosso v. Board of Adjustment, 61 A.2d 167 (N.J.
1948) (official map statute invalid as applied where it covered entire lot, prohibiting any use);
Jensen v. City of New York, 369 N.E.2d 1179 (N.Y. 1977) (official map designation of nearly
80% of property invalid as applied); Roer Constr. Corp. v. City of New Rochelle, 136 N.Y.S.2d
414 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) (official map designation preventing all use of a property invalid as
applied); Henle v. City of Euclid, 125 N.E.2d 355 (Ohio Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 122
N.E.2d 792 (Ohio 1954) (restrictive zoning designation singling out one lot until city decides
whether or not to buy it invalid as applied). Following the same line of reasoning, one might also
conclude that, because many courts have held traditional zoning designations placed on particu-
lar properties to be unconstitutional as applied, all zoning restrictions must therefore be facially
invalid.
99. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 (1980) (restricted owners' share of
benefits and burdens of living in a community developed in an orderly fashion); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 134-35 (1978). As the New York Appellate Divi-
sion expressed it:
The plaintiffs' "Compensation [sic] for such interference with and restriction in the
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fore, viewing the program as a whole, it seems difficult to conclude
that the reservation statute would effect a taking in every conceivable
case. However, because the Joint Ventures majority came to this con-
clusion, it had to consider whether the express or implied remedies
available to owners of reserved properties could rescue the statute
from invalidation. The following section tracks the majority's disposi-
tion of the remediation issue.
III. TiE SUFFICIENCY OF THE OWNERS' REMEDIES
After finding the reservation provisions of the statute violative of
the Due Process Clause, the Joint Ventures majority then rejected as
insufficient the two methods by which an affected owner could seek
relief.°° First, the court declared that the remedy of inverse condem-
nation was an inadequate substitute for direct compensation.101 It then
dismissed the statutory right to an administrative hearing as not pro-
viding relief for all types of takings.'0 2 A closer look at these rejections
shows the majority's apparent disinclination to uphold the statute.
A. Inverse Condemnation
The thrust of the majority's rejection of inverse condemnation as a
compensatory remedy was that it affords less substantive and proce-
dural protection to the property owner than actions governed by the
Florida eminent domain statutes.10 The State could not, therefore,
rely on this constitutionally "implied" cause of action to save the stat-
ute from facial invalidation. One filing such a claim "has the burden
of seeking compensation, must initiate the inverse condemnation suit,
and must finance the costs of litigation without the procedural protec-
tions afforded the condemnee.' 104 Quoting State Road Department v.
Forehand,05 the court recited these procedural safeguards, including
the right to counsel, notice, and the testimony of witnesses before the
property is taken.1 6
use of [their] property is [not only] found in the share that the owner enjoys in the
common benefit secured to all" ... but also in the case at bar in the fact that reason-
able and profitable use of the property ... can be made.
Rochester Business Inst. v. City of Rochester, 267 N.Y.S.2d 274, 279-80 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966)
(quoting People ex rel. Wineburgh Advertising Co. v. Murphy, 88 N.E. 17, 19 (N.Y. 1909)).
100. Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1990).
101. Id. at 627.
102. Id. at 627-28.
103. Id. at 627.
104. Id.
105. 56 So. 2d 901, 903 (Fla. 1952).
106. Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1990).
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In United States v. Clarke,10 7 cited by the Joint Ventures majority
for the proposition that the two types of actions are distinguished by
"important legal and practical differences,"'' 08 the U.S. Supreme
Court refused to read a right of inverse condemnation into a 1901
statute allowing "condemnation" of Native American trust lands.' °9
The Court instead forced municipal authorities to use eminent domain
to purchase the right-of-way for an existing road illegally placed
across Indian land twenty-two years before it rendered the Clarke de-
cision.110 The only prejudicial differences between the two proceedings
identified by the majority were the shifted burden of discovering the
intrusion and filing suit, as well as a different timing of valuation for
compensation purposes."' Justice Blackmun, in dissent, however, sug-
gested that the timing factor was the condemnee's principal con-
cern.12 In an inverse condemnation action, the value of the land
would be determined as of the time of the initial intrusion." 3 Because
the land in question in Clarke had been physically appropriated so
long before, the original Native American owners could suffer a loss
in total compensation if forced to sue in inverse condemnation.
Justice Blackmun opined that the condemnees therefore preferred to
force an eminent domain proceeding because it would afford a later
and more lucrative date of valuation. 14
B. Administrative Appeal
The Joint Ventures majority also dismissed the administrative ap-
peal provided in subsection 337.241(3) as an incomplete remedy to
takings challenges. "- Although it allowed appeals of "unreasonable or
arbitrary" designations that also denied the owner "a substantial por-
tion of the beneficial use" of property, this subsection, as it was
worded when the suit began, failed to provide a remedy for "reasona-
ble regulations" that "amount to a 'taking.' ' ' H6 It therefore provided
only illusory protection to property owners and rendered the highway
reservation statute a taking without compensation. 1 7
107. 445 U.S. 253 (1980).
108. 563 So. 2d at 627.
109. 445 U.S. at 254-55.
110. Id. at 260-61 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 257-58.
112. Id. at 262 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 258.
114. Id. at 262 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
115. Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1990).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 628.
PLANNED CONDEMNATIONS
C. Analysis of the Court's Rejection of the Owners' Remedies
The salient differences between the inverse condemnation and emi-
nent domain proceedings cited by the Joint Ventures and Clarke ma-
jorities are the shifted burden of initiating action and the timing of the
valuation."8 In the context of the Florida reservation program, the
notice provisions of the statute should have mooted the concerns ex-
pressed by the court in Clarke that allowing a taking before determin-
ing its value would allow physical intrusions to occur unnoticed. In
addition, although property in Florida commonly appreciates in
value, the timing of the "taking" for valuation purposes is unlikely to
cause owners much hardship, especially because the delay is for only a
few years and most properties are unlikely to be so substantially im-
paired as to be "taken" anyway. Inverse condemnation, as former
Chief Justice Ehrlich indicated in his dissent, is a widely used and ac-
cepted technique for assessing the costs of a taking after it has oc-
curred and generally suffers from no greater due process scrutiny than
does eminent domain." 9
The administrative appeal procedure's shortcomings are similarly
difficult to discern, especially considering the amendments to the stat-
ute enacted the year before the supreme court delivered the Joint Ven-
tures decision. In 1989, the Legislature changed the requirement that
an appealing owner establish both unreasonable or arbitrary applica-
tion of the restrictions and substantial deprivation of property rights.
After July 1 of that year, an owner could appeal if either had oc-
curred.2 0 The 1989 Legislature also added a variance procedure that
allowed for local appeals of permit denials in cases where the reserva-
tion restrictions "would constitute an unnecessary hardship" to use of
the property.' 2 ' Hence the court, which passed judgment on section
337.241 as it existed when the Joint Ventures appeal began, invali-
dated a statute that had been substantially amended in a critical
area.
2
118. An unmentioned but possible concern may also have been the owner's hurdle in proving
damages in the absence of the actual conveyance of the property, which is more likely to occur in
an eminent domain action.
119. Joint Ventures, 563 So. 2d 622, 628-29 (Ehrlich, C.J., dissenting). The U.S. Supreme
Court has seemed even to encourage inverse condemnation as an owner's remedy. See, e.g., First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (own-
ers are constitutionally entitled to an action in inverse condemnation when the public takes prop-
erty); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194-97
(1985) (owner must exhaust state compensatory remedies, including inverse condemnation, be-
fore asserting a claim for taking without compensation).
120. Ch. 89-232, § 9, 1989 Fla. Laws 971, 975-76 (amending FLA. STAT. § 337.241(3)).
121. Id.
122. Although the wording of the statute in 1987 would be relevant to its effect on the own-
ers of Joint Ventures, Inc., their claim against DOT was settled in 1988.
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The court's failure to consider the effects of the subsequent legisla-
tion leaves the status of the current reservation law in doubt. Is the
amended statute still constitutionally infirm? If so, could it be cured
by any remedy short of mandatory direct compensation to all owners
of reserved lands? Unfortunately, the majority opinion left these im-
portant questions for another day.
IV. AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF PLANNED CONDEMNATIONS
Although the majority's treatment of the reservation statute raises a
number of legal and jurisprudential questions, the primary effect of
the Joint Ventures decision will be economic: the public will pay more
to acquire property. This impact raises an additional question: What
rule or approach to condemnations planned in advance would pro-
duce the greatest overall social benefit or minimize economic waste? A
review of the dilemma of planned condemnations from an economic
standpoint reveals some of the costs and benefits of the various alter-
natives, as well as reasons why maintaining some development restric-
tions on properties to be acquired in the near future promotes the
public welfare.
A. The Dilemma
A public body contending with rapid economic growth in a highway
corridor faces a quandary: It needs to plan for future expansion of the
facility, in this case a roadway, yet it has no use for land acquired
years in advance. Such land would sit idle until that body could, using
the most recent information available, lay out the exact boundaries of
the right-of-way needed. Such land is more productively held by pri-
vate owners, in whose hands it can be used as before. Conversely, if
left in private hands without restrictions, this same property could be
the site of substantial construction, which would force the public to
choose between altering the project or buying the buildings and tear-
ing them down.
Such restrictions, of course, could work substantial hardship on a
private owner if his or her use of the overall property is significantly
impaired without any compensation. Hence, a rule that categorically
prohibits construction and denies compensation is unfair and unpro-
ductive, while one that forces the public to choose between blind ac-
quisition in advance and buying new and useless buildings is wasteful.
B. The Coase Analogy
The dilemma just described is analogous to the one illustrated by
R.H. Coase in his classic essay The Problem of Social Cost.2 1 Coase
123. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1,29(1960).
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sought to expose the flaws in economist A.C. Pigou's position that
mandatory compensation for all damages to others is always the most
socially desirable rule. His example, taken from a book by Pigou, 124
dealt with the problem of England's compensation rules for damage
to farmlands from fires ignited by random sparks from steam en-
gines. 25 Pigou had argued that mandatory compensation was more
desirable than the existing "no liability" rule, because a compensation
requirement would encourage the railroads to adopt the technology
and operating practices that minimized collateral damage to farms ad-
jacent to the tracks. 126 Coase responded that, although appealing on
its surface, such a categorical requirement would also have the unde-
sirable effect of encouraging farmers, who would then bear none of
the risk of fire, to cultivate the very lands most vulnerable to dam-
age. 127 Simultaneously, such a rule would decrease the marginal ad-
vantage to the railroad of running more trains.128 In other words,
mandatory compensation would remove the farmers' incentive to
avoid the danger and would discourage the railroad from increasing
its production. Therefore, such a rule would not in all cases produce
the most efficient or productive result. 129
The difference between cases where the mandatory compensation
rule would produce the most efficient result and those where it would
not, of course, depends on other factors, such as the probability and
cost of crop damage and the relative productivity of the other lands
available for cultivation. In the context of the reservation law, the rel-
ative productivity factor appears in terms of the alternatives available
to private owners of lands adjacent to or in highway corridors. Be-
cause in all likelihood the majority of such owners stand to lose the
use of only a strip of frontage along the roadway, the remainder of
the property will in most cases provide an alternative building site.
The risk factor complicates the reservation problem in two impor-
tant ways. Because the Florida statute provides for up to ten years of
reservation with no requirement that DOT ever acquire the property,
DOT bears almost none of the cost of a reservation and, therefore,
has little incentive to restrain itself. On the other hand, in the absence
of restrictions, the private owner negotiating with DOT has no incen-
tive to avoid the risk of having to turn the new building over to the
condemnor, except for the risk that the ultimate compensation for it
124. ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THt EcoNomIcs OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932).
125. Coase, supra note 123.
126. Id. at 31-32.
127. Id. at 32-33.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 34.
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will be inadequate. If an owner prefers to take such risks or can find a
way to gain a premium over costs for that building by, for example,
claiming business damages or using the increasing value of the build-
ing under construction to extort the State, then he or she will be in-
clined to begin construction, whether intending to complete it or not.
C. Alternative Provisions
The reservation rule that would promote the most efficient use of
social and natural resources would prevent or discourage reckless con-
struction of buildings in areas where condemnation is highly likely,
yet discourage DOT from reserving more land than it really intends to
acquire. As it existed in 1987, Florida's reservation program left the
private owner of wholly reserved land few opportunities to use his or
her property more productively. On the other hand, the alternative
chosen by the supreme court leaves all owners of properties to be con-
demned in a position to increase their remuneration under eminent
domain through wasteful construction. Both choices encourage un-
productive behavior. What remedial measures, then, would permit a
reservation statute to limit such behavior, yet still allow for productive
use of the lands in question?
The permit-or-buy approach, 130 used in some other states and now
enacted in Florida,' encourages owners of reserved lands who have
no current use for their property to force the state to acquire it in
advance by applying for a building permit. This alternative would
have the advantage of allowing the private owner to deploy his or her
investment elsewhere. It would also, however, likely leave the state
owning an asset it has no current use for, yet must maintain.
In contrast, the variance clause 132 gives private owners of properties
incurring "unnecessary hardship" an opportunity to make productive
use of their land in the interim. Consequently, although it is likely to
increase the cost of public acquisition, such a provision, if applied in a
130. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
131. In the wake of Joint Ventures, the Legislature created FLA. STAT. § 337.243, titled as a
separate "Roadway corridor official map procedure." Ch 90-227, § 17, 1990 Fla. Laws 1656,
1675. This new mechanism, which provides for direct notice to owners only after DOT files the
map, uses a permit-or-buy clause as its sole remediation. See Scott J. Johnson & Sally E. Bond,
Landmark Decision Advances Litigation Rights of Florida Property Owners, 64 FLA. B.J. 52, 54
(Oct. 1990). Combined, these two differences would seem to make the new statute even less
likely than section 337.241 to survive judicial review. Though it resembles the Delaware statutory
program invalidated in Lackman v. Hall, 364 A.2d 1244 (Del. Ch. 1976), this new provision has
not yet been challenged in court, apparently because DOT has not used it. See supra notes 77-79
and accompanying text.
132. FLA. STAT. § 337.241(2)(b)-(d) (1991).
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prudent manner, may provide relief in cases where the characteristics
of the property in question leave the owner no productive alternative.
The administrative appeal clause, ' a as amended in 1989, should have
a similar effect.
The variance and appeal procedures, combined with the possibility
of an outright suit in inverse condemnation, also act as checks against
any tendency of the State to reserve large swaths of individual proper-
ties. Neither of these remedies, however, discourage DOT from re-
serving many more miles of total future right-of-way than it is likely
to use in a planning period short enough to assure that its projections
of need are reasonably accurate. The best prevention for this potential
abuse may therefore be to place a statewide cap on the amount of
right-of-way reserved, expressed either in terms of acreage or in terms
of the total funding available in the normal highway planning and
funding interval.13 4
These efficiency considerations therefore warrant two changes to
the statute as it existed at the end of 1990. First, the alternative reser-
vation provision featuring the permit-or-buy clause should be
scrapped as promoting premature and haphazard transfer of property
to public ownership. Second, the Legislature should cap the overall
amount of land covered by reservation restrictions to conform with
the funding available for right-of-way acquisition within DOT's five-
year planning horizon. With this amendment, section 337.241 should
still be able to inhibit wasteful construction, yet survive a second fa-
cial challenge.
V. CONCLUSION
The Florida Supreme Court held the state's highway reservation law
unconstitutional as an improper use of the police power to take pri-
vate property without compensation. The court, however, could have
found ample justification for indicating approval of the amended stat-
ute as addressing a legitimate public welfare concern in a state strug-
gling to keep public facilities concurrent with rapid growth, while
reserving the right to invalidate specific reservations for arbitrary or
unreasonable application, for lasting too long, or for enveloping too
much of a particular property. Although it condemned the very pur-
133. Id. § 337.241(3).
134. A five-year planning horizon is common nationwide, a function of the federal govern-
ment's highway program, which finances much of the nations's highway construction and sets
the standards for cooperating state transportation planning programs. See generally Sandra Ro-
senbloom, Transportation Planning, in THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING 139,
145-51 (Frank S. So & Judith Getzels eds., 2d ed. 1988).
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pose of the statute and thereby cast doubt on the validity of any res-
trictions placed on lands slated for public acquisition, the history of
this area of the law shows that other courts making such broad decla-
rations have reacted favorably to properly designed reservation pro-
grams in subsequent cases. 3 ' These courts have correctly distinguished
development regulations that preclude any reasonable use of a prop-
erty and thereby constitute a taking from those restrictions that
merely alter the configuration of a reasonable use to protect the public
as a whole. The latter are exercises in sound and reasonable public
planning.
Until the issue is revisited, the Joint Ventures decision will encour-
age not only wasteful construction, but also unproductive litigation
concerning compensation for "temporary takings." In his dissent to
the First Lutheran decision, which declared that even temporary dep-
rivations of all property rights can constitute takings and therefore
require compensation, Justice Stevens began: "One thing is certain.
The Court's decision today will generate a great deal of litigation.
Most of it, I believe, will be unproductive.' 3 6 By declaring that all of
DOT's reservations effected unconstitutional takings no matter how
little of the property they enveloped, the Joint Ventures decision itself
seeded a crop of lawsuits seeking damages for temporary deprivations
of property rights during the period when the reservations were in ef-
fect. In Orlando/Orange County Expressway Authority v. W & F
Agrigrowth-Fernfield, Ltd.,'37 for example, Joint Ventures was cited
as justification for a summary judgment holding that compensation is
due every owner of lands reserved under the program.'38 Because Flor-
ida courts award attorney's fees and costs to all plaintiffs who can
establish a taking in inverse condemnation, 3 9 each such owner is now
free to sue the State for damages, at the State's expense." 0 Further, he
135. See, e.g., State ex rel. Miller v. Manders, 86 N.W.2d 469 (Wis. 1957); Headley v. City
of Rochester, 5 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y. 1936); supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
136. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 322
(1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. 582 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 591 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1991).
138. Id. at 792. Although DOT, and presumably the local expressway authorities, withdrew
all maps of reservation immediately after the Joint Ventures decision was announced, see Dep't
of Transp., Topic No. 575-010-010-a, Directive, Withdrawal of Right of Way Reservation Maps
(May 2, 1990), the court ordered DOT to pay damages for its temporary impairment of the
property's use during the period the reservation restrictions were in effect.
139. See State Road Dep't v. Lewis, 190 So. 2d 598, 600 (Fla. Ist DCA), cert. dismissed, 192
So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1966).
140. At the time the Joint Ventures decision was announced, an internal DOT memo esti-
mated that approximately 4200 parcels were affected by reservations. Memorandum from Rob-
ert I. Scanlan, Interim General Counsel, Dep't of Transp., to Ben G. Watts, Secretary, Dep't of
Transp. (May 1, 1990) (Fiscal Impact of Unconstitutionality of Map of Reservation Statute)
(available at the Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
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or she may keep the property until the State pays again to condemn it.
The dimensions of the potential public liability are staggering.
A more productive approach would have been to condone limited
development restrictions on such lands, so long as the statute provided
for remediation in cases of severe deprivation. Had the majority ex-
pressed its approval for the amended reservation statute, it would
have left the State of Florida better able to provide for the welfare of
the citizenry as a whole, yet it would have still protected individual
property owners from confiscatory regulation without just compensa-
tion.

